Privacy and information security risks in a technology platform for home-based chronic disease rehabilitation and education by unknown
Henriksen et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:85
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/85RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessPrivacy and information security risks in a
technology platform for home-based chronic
disease rehabilitation and education
Eva Henriksen1*, Tatjana M Burkow1, Elin Johnsen1 and Lars K Vognild2Abstract
Background: Privacy and information security are important for all healthcare services, including home-based
services. We have designed and implemented a prototype technology platform for providing home-based
healthcare services. It supports a personal electronic health diary and enables secure and reliable communication
and interaction with peers and healthcare personnel. The platform runs on a small computer with a dedicated
remote control. It is connected to the patient’s TV and to a broadband Internet. The platform has been tested with
home-based rehabilitation and education programs for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes. As part
of our work, a risk assessment of privacy and security aspects has been performed, to reveal actual risks and to
ensure adequate information security in this technical platform.
Methods: Risk assessment was performed in an iterative manner during the development process. Thus, security
solutions have been incorporated into the design from an early stage instead of being included as an add-on to a
nearly completed system. We have adapted existing risk management methods to our own environment, thus
creating our own method. Our method conforms to ISO’s standard for information security risk management.
Results: A total of approximately 50 threats and possible unwanted incidents were identified and analysed. Among
the threats to the four information security aspects: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and quality; confidentiality
threats were identified as most serious, with one threat given an unacceptable level of High risk. This is because
health-related personal information is regarded as sensitive. Availability threats were analysed as low risk, as the aim
of the home programmes is to provide education and rehabilitation services; not for use in acute situations or for
continuous health monitoring.
Conclusions: Most of the identified threats are applicable for healthcare services intended for patients or citizens in
their own homes. Confidentiality risks in home are different from in a more controlled environment such as a
hospital; and electronic equipment located in private homes and communicating via Internet, is more exposed to
unauthorised access. By implementing the proposed measures, it has been possible to design a home-based
service which ensures the necessary level of information security and privacy.
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The increasing prevalence of chronic conditions has be-
come a major concern to healthcare systems throughout
the world. Healthcare provision faces a shift in emphasis
from the management of acute illnesses to the provision
of long-term services for people with chronic conditions
[1,2]. In this shift, the home environment may have an
important role in chronic disease management; for second-
ary prevention and follow-up, improved self-management
skills and quality of life, stabilisation of the chronic disease,
prevention of exacerbations, and less hospitalisation.
We have designed and implemented a prototype technol-
ogy platform for providing home-based healthcare services.
It supports a personal electronic health diary and enables
secure and reliable communication and interaction with
peers and healthcare personnel. The platform runs on a
small computer (the Residential Patient Device, RPD) with
a dedicated remote control. It is connected to the patient’s
TV and to a broadband Internet connection. A web camera
and a microphone are used during videoconferencing.
By making the technical platform appear as a “smart
TV” solution, we also aimed at reaching people less fa-
miliar with computers. Our technical platform, includ-
ing its security measures, has been used in real settings
in several trials [3,4].
Privacy and security are important for all healthcare
services, including home-based services. As part of our
work, a risk assessment of privacy and information
security aspects was performed. The motivation for the
risk assessment was to reveal actual information security
risks and to ensure that the security of the technical
platform was adequate. The risk assessment was first
performed early in the design process; it was revisited
and updated later in the development process. In this
way, information security was embedded into the design,
in line with the concept of “Privacy by design” [5].
This paper describes the risk assessment and its findings,
and the security measures which were implemented.
We also discuss some general privacy concerns relating
to home-based systems in healthcare.
The services and the technical platform
The two services subject to risk assessment were two
home programmes: a comprehensive pulmonary rehabilita-
tion programme and an education programme for diabetes
self-management, both for virtual online groups. The aim
of the home programmes is improved access to education
and rehabilitation. The home programmes are based on
conventional programmes, respectively: 1) a group-based
pulmonary rehabilitation programme which encompasses
education, exercising, and psychosocial support over
several weeks, and 2) a two-day group-based course in
diabetes self-management, with a telephone service for
individual diabetes consultation.Both home programmes had weekly group education
sessions and individual consultation sessions. In addition,
the pulmonary rehabilitation programme had weekly
group exercise sessions. An individual consultation
with a physiotherapist, pulmonary nurse, or diabetes
nurse was introduced as an opportunity for addressing
potential personal health matters which they did not
want to discuss in the presence of peers. An exercise video
(rehabilitation only) and educational videos were also
available for the participants.
The patients had a personal electronic health diary for
daily use, with a health-related multiple-choice question-
naire, manual input of pulse oximetry values from a self-
administered pulse oximeter (Nonin Medical, Inc), and
input of blood glucose values from a self-administered
OneTouch Ultra Blood Glucose Meter (LifeScan, Inc.)
connected through a wireless Bluetooth adapter.
The electronic health diary stores the entered informa-
tion. The health diary is intended both to support patient
self-management and to provide supplementary informa-
tion for the weekly individual consultation. Each patient
explicitly made one week of the health diary data available
to the healthcare personnel ahead of each consultation, and
the encrypted data were transferred over the Internet from
home to a server at the hospital. The healthcare personnel
could then access the patient’s health diary before the indi-
vidual weekly consultation.
The RPD has components for the following functionality:
multiparty videoconferencing, storage and visualisation of
health diary information, storage and playback of videos,
storage and presentation of textual information, wireless
incorporation of data from the LifeScan blood glucose
meter, and data encryption and transfer of information
from home to the hospital information system. The
multiparty videoconference component was used for
both educational and exercise group sessions and for
the individual consultations. The RPD performed no
actions or manipulation on the data, except for storage,
archival, and communication. Therefore, the RPD is
not considered to be a medical device, according to di-
rectives 93/42/EEC [6] and 2007/47/EC [7], and based
on the EC guidance document MEDDEV 2.1/6 [8].
More information on the platform and services can be
found in [3,4,9].
Legal baseline and security requirements
Requirements concerning the electronic communication
of personal information are imposed by national legislation.
In European countries these are based on the EU directive
on processing of personal data [10]. In the US, similar re-
quirements are based on the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [11]. Under both
international and Norwegian legislation, all health-related
information concerning an identifiable person is considered
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health professionals who have a treatment relationship to
the person should be able to access this person’s health in-
formation, unless the person has given his or her consent.
In Norway, strong emphasis is put on privacy consider-
ations, also in the healthcare sector.
Most chronically ill patients need, at least to some
extent, to have their next-of-kin involved in their care.
These individuals are often considered a valuable resource
in the treatment and follow-up of the patient. In terms of
Norwegian legislation, it is up to the patient to decide
whether their next-of-kin should be informed about the
details of their condition [13]. If that happens, there is a
corresponding exemption from the commitment to pro-
fessional confidentiality for the healthcare workers [14].
Information security is usually defined as including the
three main aspects confidentiality, integrity, and availability
[12,15,16]. In the Norwegian healthcare legislation [17],
quality is included as a fourth aspect of information se-
curity. Quality can be seen as overlapping with integrity,
and these aspects are often merged in analyses of secur-
ity threats and risks. However, for applications involving
images, video, and audio, it is often useful to manage
these two aspects separately. Quality may also be a relevant
security aspect in the analysis of applications where usabil-
ity, ease of use, and user interface are important. The fol-
lowing is a brief definition of the four security aspects:
 Confidentiality is the property that information is
not made available for or disclosed to unauthorised
persons, entities, or processes.
 Integrity relates to the trustworthiness of the
information. It is the property that data have not been
deliberately tampered with, nor accidentally changed.
 Availability is the property that information is accessible
and usable upon demand by an authorised entity.
 Quality refers to the information being correct and
not misleading.
Because of the sensitivity of personal health informa-
tion, confidentiality is particularly important within the
healthcare sector. Confidentiality requirements originate
from the professional secrecy and non-disclosure under-
taking required of all healthcare workers – all the way
back to Hippocrates 2400 years ago. The Hippocratic
Oath states: “What I may see or hear in the course of the
treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to
the life of men, which on no account one must spread
abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful
to be spoken about [18].”
Privacy is another side of confidentiality. Article 1 of
the EU Directive on processing of personal data [10]
specifies the “right to privacy with respect to processing
of personal data”. A rule of thumb could be to defineprivacy as the right of the client and confidentiality the
duty of the service provider [19].
Methods
Security risk analysis is a basic requirement of ISO 27002
[15], internationally recognised as the generic information
security standard. In our case, risk assessment is performed
with respect to the information security aspects confidenti-
ality, integrity, availability, and quality.
There are two basic types of risk analysis methods:
qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative methods use
mathematical and statistical tools to represent risk, e.g.
by including a calculation of the expected loss of value to
an asset. In qualitative risk analysis, risk is analysed by
using linguistic variables (adjectives) rather than using
mathematics [20]. Qualitative assessment techniques base
the risk assessment on anecdotal or knowledge-driven
factors [21]. Our risk assessment approach is qualitative.
We regard this to be the best approach when assessing new
technology being developed for a new model of service
delivery. In our case, the final design of technology and
service was still to be decided, and there was not much
relevant quantitative information available. A qualitative
approach opened for discussions of risk aspects in groups
involving relevant stakeholders. In these circumstances it is
more appropriate to express likelihood and consequence in
terms of “adjectives”, instead of unfounded numbers for
percentage and money. In addition, methods based on
qualitative measures may be more suitable for today’s com-
plex environment of information systems [20].
There are several methods and guidelines for how to
conduct risk analysis; they all include the central tasks of
– identifying threats and possible unwanted incidents
– analysing impacts and likelihood of the identified threats
– evaluating risks with respect to acceptance criteria
There seem to be a lack of relevant literature which
present risk assessment of information security in healthcare
settings, especially within home-based e-health services.
Standards for risk assessment in general, as well as
textbooks describing ways to perform risk assessment,
are available. Organisations often adapt existing risk
management methods to their own environment and cul-
ture, thus creating their own method [22]. Our method has
evolved through several risk assessments [23-25], and it
conforms to ISO’s standards for risk management, ISO
31000 [26] and ISO 27005 [27].
The standards set out the risk analysis process in five
main steps:
1. Context establishment: describe the subject of the
analysis, i.e. the system to be analysed and its
environment.
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incidents might possibly happen, i.e. identify threats
and vulnerabilities.
3. Risk analysis: consider the consequences of the
threats and the likelihood that these consequences
may occur, i.e. impact and probability analysis.
4. Risk evaluation: relate the resulting risk level to the
risk acceptance criteria, i.e. decide which risks might
be acceptable or not.
5. Risk treatment: identify and assess risk treatment
options.
Steps 2, 3, and 4 are collectively referred to as “Risk
assessment”. In our method, these steps are often
performed in a series of risk assessment meetings.
Meeting participants are persons with the necessary
knowledge about the analysed system. The process is
led by a risk assessment expert.
By doing risk assessment in an iterative manner, it be-
comes an important part of the design and development
process. We performed the first risk assessment at an
early stage in the design phase, and repeated it as a
review and update later on in the development process.
In this way, security requirements have been identified,
and security solutions were incorporated into the design
from the early development phase instead of being included
as an add-on to a nearly completed system.
The following sections describe our use of the risk as-
sessment method, step by step.
Step 1: Context establishment
A high-level description of the system and service and
the environment for its use, is necessary in order to per-
form a risk assessment at an architectural level [21]. In
addition to a written description, which is included in
the risk assessment report, this is often performed as a
walk-through of the system and service, presented at the
first risk assessment meeting.
It is also necessary to identify the assets to be
protected. In most health-related projects, the patients’
life and health is the main asset. However, in this case
the services in question have hardly any potential to
harm the patient’s health. But there are other assets to
protect, such as the patients’ right to privacy; the hard-
ware and software of the system itself; sensitive informa-
tion in the system; other healthcare systems and their
information, which could be affected from this system;
and trust in, and the reputation of, the services and the
service provider.
As a part of establishing the context, the risk acceptance
criteria are stated during this first phase of the risk assess-
ment. The acceptance criteria are related to the security
requirements. It is not possible to completely avoid any
risk – to have a risk level of zero. But it is difficult todefine that small level of risk which might be acceptable,
especially at an early stage of the service and technology
development.
It is, however, important to have a common under-
standing of the acceptance criteria. The following criteria
were discussed for our risk assessment:
 A patient should not die or have a reduction in
health as a result of using these services.
No such risk would be accepted in these types of
services, as for conventional rehabilitation and
education programmes.
 Unauthorised persons should not be able to acquire a
patient’s health information (confidentiality breach).
An “unauthorised person” is anyone without a
treatment role towards the patient, so this includes
family members and relatives. However, for patients
with a chronic disease, family members are often
considered resource persons in the treatment and
follow-up care. In our case, it may be difficult for
patients to conceal that they have a chronic disease,
especially for COPD patients who are receiving
long-term oxygen therapy.
To understand the type and amount of
information that might be disclosed is vital for a
decision on the acceptability of the risk. In
addition to being a legal question, it may also be
an individual and subjective question, as to which
information should be kept secure. Users may
want information to remain private even if it does
not concern a matter which is legally defined as
“sensitive” information.
 A patient’s health information should not be modified
or deleted by unauthorised persons or as a result of
software or hardware errors (integrity breach).
By “modify” we mean to insert wrong information,
or to alter or remove existing information. As a
worst case, this might cause that a patient receive
a wrong medical advice or a wrong treatment, but
in most cases the only result is destroyed data.
 Stored information should not be permanently lost
(availability breach).
In the context of our study, there would be no
serious consequences for the patient if data
registered in this system were deleted, but it
would indicate that the system is not trustworthy.
The confidence in and reputation of this system
and the services would diminish with an
increasing number of such incidents.
 Access to the system and/or its information should
not be rendered impossible for those who are
entitled to such access (availability breach).
There would be no serious consequence for the
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the reputation of, the system and the services
would diminish on the frequency of unavailability.At this first step of the risk assessment process, defini-
tions of levels for consequence, likelihood and risk were
presented and discussed. In the absence of statistical
information or other quantitative information from an
operational system, we describe the different levels using
qualitative values, sometimes referred to as “linguistic
variables” or adjectives [22]. It can be difficult to define
the values before threats are identified, and the definitions
usually need to be reviewed and updated when they are in
use during step 3 of the process. Definitions used in our
risk assessment are presented in Table 1.
Step 2: Threat identification
The second step of the risk assessment process, the
identification of possible threats and unwanted incidents,
was performed as a structured brainstorming between
the project members. The brainstorming process was
“structured” in the way that a walkthrough of the intendede 1 Definitions of values for consequence, likelihood, and
quence:
For the hospital or the service: No violation of law; offence t
recovered; or small reduction of reputation in the short run.
can be recovered; or small reduction of reputation in the sh
rate For the hospital or the service: Offence, less serious violation
which can be recovered; or reduction of reputation that ma
health or a minor temporary impact; or financial loss which
less sensitive or offensive health information.
e For the hospital or the service: Violation of law which results
recovered; or serious loss of reputation that will affect trust
financial loss which cannot be recovered; or serious loss of r
trophic For the hospital or the service: Serious violation of law whic
be recovered; or serious loss of reputation which is devastat
of health; or considerable financial loss which cannot be rec
health, and finances.
ood:
Rare, occurs less frequently than every 10th year, or less than 1
system is needed; or special equipment is needed; or it can on
m May happen, occurs not more than once a year, or between
knowledge about the system is sufficient; or normally availa
Fairly often, occurs several times a year, or between 30 % an
knowledge about the system; or without any additional equ
high Very often, occurs several times a month or more frequent tha
knowledge about the system; or without any additional equip
evel:
Acceptable risk. The service can be used with the identified
increase the risk level.
m Possibly an acceptable risk for this particular service, but eac
risk must be monitored on a regular basis, with an assessme
Unacceptable risk. Cannot start using the service before riskservices was performed, using predefined keywords
and attributes. Keywords related to the security aspects
confidentiality, integrity, quality, and availability, and
to attributes such as “internal” and “external” (threats),
and “deliberate” and “accidental” (actions). The identi-
fied threats and the discussion were summarised in a
threat table.
The production of a threat table is a documentation
technique which we use throughout the risk assessment
process. Brainstorming, with the use of a table to docu-
ment the threats, corresponds to the technique used in
the risk analysis method HazOP [28,29]. We have, how-
ever, found it convenient to use some other columns in
our threat table. These are:
1. unique identifier of threat (threat number),
2. textual description of threat or unwanted incidence,
3. consequence value,
4. likelihood value,
5. risk value (as a product of consequence and likelihood),
6. any other comments from the brainstorming
(including ideas for risk treatment).risk level used in the risk assessment
hat does not lead to reaction; or negligible financial loss which can be
For the patient: No impact on health; or negligible financial loss which
ort run.
of law which results in a warning or a reprimand; or financial loss
y influence trust and respect. For the patient: No direct impact on
can be recovered; or some loss of reputation caused by revelation of
in minor penalty or fine; or a large financial loss which cannot be
and respect for a long time. For the patient: Reduced health; or some
eputation caused by revealing of sensitive and offending information.
h results in a penalty or fine; or considerable financial loss which cannot
ing for trust and respect. For the patient: Death or permanent damage
overed; or serious loss of reputation which permanently affects life,
0 % of the times the system/service is used. Detailed knowledge about the
ly be performed deliberately and with the help of internal personnel.
10 % and 30 % of the times the system/service is used. Normal
ble equipment can be used; or it can be performed deliberately.
d 50 % of the times the system/service is used. Can be done with minor
ipment being used; or it can occur because of wrong or careless usage.
n 50 % of the times the system/service is used. Can be done without any
ment being used; or it can occur because of wrong or careless usage.
threats, but the threats must be observed to detect changes that could
h threat must be considered separately and the development of the
nt of whether remedial measures should be implemented.
reducing measures have been implemented.
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written into the threat table (column 2), together with
any relevant comments (column 6), including those
related to consequence and likelihood. Subsequently,
the threat table was refined, by grouping related threats,
and putting threats into a relevant sequence. At this stage,
each threat was given a unique identifier (column 1).
Values for consequence, likelihood, and risk were added in
later steps of the process.
The threats identified in our risk assessment are listed
in Table 2 which corresponds to the first two columns of
our threat table.
Step 3: Impact and probability analysis
In step 3 of the process, the identified threats and un-
wanted incidents were analysed. For each possible threat
we asked the project participants to evaluate the impact
or consequence and the likelihood that the threat or inci-
dent would occur. The qualitative values for consequence
and likelihood (as defined in Table 1) were inserted in the
threat table, columns 3 and 4, for each identified threat.
It is particularly difficult to set a value for likelihood
when the system is at an early stage of development; it is
difficult to identify vulnerabilities before the system is
built and tested. When deciding on a value for likelihood
one could ask relevant questions, for instance related to
the ease and motivation for the threats. In our case, the
following questions were useful:
– Knowledge, acquaintance: Must an attacker know
the configuration of the system? Does he or she
need to know a password or PIN? Or is it sufficient
to turn on the TV or the computer? Is the system
“always on”?
– Remedies: Does an attacker need special equipment,
e.g. a smartcard or a code-calculator? Does he or
she need access to special software, or would access
to normally available software and hardware be
sufficient?
– Mistakes: How easy is it to make mistakes?
(Mistakes can be caused by insufficient user
education or training, or by a poor user interface.)
– Motivation: Would any third party be interested in
viewing the information? Would anyone have an
interest in deliberately modifying the information?
Step 4: Risk evaluation
The risk of a threat is defined as the product of consequence
and likelihood for that threat. This is illustratively repre-
sented by a two-dimensional matrix (like Figure 1).
In step 4 of the process, the unique ID of each identified
threat was written into the corresponding cell of the matrix.
The result of our risk assessment is shown in the risk
matrix in Figure 1. The shading of the cells in thematrix indicates the three risk levels defined in Table 1.
The risk value of each threat, indicated by the position
in the matrix, was also inserted into column 5 of the
threat table.
Step 5: Risk treatment
For all threats with a non-acceptable risk level, risk-
reducing treatment was proposed and discussed (step 5
of the risk assessment process). The responsibility for
follow-up of the proposed measures is outside the scope
of the risk assessment. That responsibility belongs to
the project management.
There are basically four different approaches to managing
a risk [27].
 Risk retention – accept the risk in accordance with
the organisation’s security policy. This applies to
those risks that are deemed low enough to be
acceptable. It is worth remembering that accepting
the risk does not mean that the unwanted incident
indicated by the threat is acceptable.
 Risk reduction – reduce the risk to an acceptable
level. Since risk is a product of likelihood and
consequence, this implies reduction of the likelihood,
the consequence, or both. It is most difficult to reduce
the consequence of a threat; the focus should
therefore first of all be on reduction of likelihood.
 Risk avoidance – not be exposed to the risk, do not
do the things that could lead to the risk.
 Risk transfer – transfer the risk to a third party
(e.g. to an insurance company)
Risk reduction measures should be considered and
evaluated with reference to the cost-benefit for the service.
Some measures might reduce the risk level for several
threats at the same time. Cheap and easy-to-implement
measures that are likely to reduce the risk of even an accept-
able threat should be implemented as a matter of course.
Results
Identified threats
A total of approximately 50 threats and potential un-
wanted incidents were identified and analysed. Each
threat was given a unique identifier whereby the initial
letter shows the security category the threat belongs to:
c = confidentiality; i = integrity; q = quality; a = availabil-
ity. – The relevant threats identified are listed in Table 2
(a few threats which were considered irrelevant have
been excluded from this summary). Threats to health
information can occur in the patient’s home, at the remote
server, or during transfer between the system in the pa-
tient’s home and the server. The intermediate headings in
the table indicate a grouping according to subsystems of
the analysed system in question and its context.
Table 2 List of threats identified in the risk assessment
ID Threats/unwanted incidents
Locally– at the patient’s home
c1 Unauthorised persons can view/read personal (sensitive) health information because the user has forgotten to switch off (or “log out” from)
the RPD.
c3 Unauthorised persons can view/read personal (sensitive) health information because the PIN code (or password or another authentication
mechanism) is available/known – e.g. too weak/simple (a general problem)
c4 Unauthorised persons can view/read personal (sensitive) health information because the RPD with stored information is stolen, then
restarted and accessed without authorisation.
c5 Video conference (VC) to participant at home (individual sessions): Unauthorised persons present in the patient’s home, outside camera
view, may happen to hear personal information given to this patient by health personnel (e.g. instructions/education regarding his/her
own disease) Remember: Unauthorised persons are persons (including family members and visitors) with whom the patient does not want
to share that information.
c6 Group education via VC (all patients in their own home): Unauthorised persons in a patient’s home, outside camera view, can see and hear
other patients/participants without their knowledge.
c7 The RPD is compromised because of software weaknesses, making it possible for unauthorised persons to see/log ongoing activity.
c8 Wireless data transfer from sensor to RPD can be intercepted by others.
i1 Unauthorised persons (e.g. grandchildren who play with the sensor) can by accident (i.e. unintentionally) insert false values if the system is
not fail safe. That is, measures taken from other persons than the registered user are entered.
i3 Unauthorised persons (e.g. other family members or visitors) can deliberately insert fake values.
i4 The patient him-/herself can by mistake modify inserted values or insert erroneous values (e.g. it is easy to type in wrong O2 values).
i7 The patient him/herself can deliberately insert fake values or modify inserted values.
i8 Data in the RPD is corrupted - e.g. wrong clock time from a sensor may follow the sensor value and cause existing data to be overwritten.
i9 SW/HW-weaknesses in the RPD that can be exploited (e.g. by malware) in such a way that the information is being damaged or modified.
i10 The RPD is stolen and software, keys or configuration are being exploited for unauthorised communication.
i12 The RPD is being compromised because of SW weaknesses and becomes a relay for attacking healthcare systems, e.g. by sending messages
containing executable payload.
i14 Unauthorised persons can remotely configure the RPD, install/update software, etc., thus making the system behave differently than specified.
a1 The service is unavailable for both the patient and the health personnel because the RPD has been stolen.
a2 Data from the RPD cannot be retrieved locally by the patient (SW or HW errors, e.g. disk crash).
a3 Data from the RPD cannot be sent to the health personnel (SW or HW errors).
a4 The RPD is damaged (crushed, fire, dropped to the floor etc.) so that data cannot be retrieved or inserted.
a5 Shutdown because of electricity power failure in the patient’s home.
a6 The patient forgets his PIN-code (or other authentication method) so that data cannot be retrieved from the RPD at home. (Information
sent is available at the central server.)
a7 PKI certificates expire. If this happens, it is not possible to send data with valid signatures or to encrypt correctly for the specified recipient.
a8 SW/HW weaknesses in the RPD that can be exploited (e.g. by malware) in such a way that stored information is destroyed/deleted or
access is blocked (e.g. Denial of Service attack, DoS)
a9 Patients will not use the system: “Too high-tech”. Fear of surveillance. Feeling of lack of control. Afraid of damaging the system.
Think it is difficult to use.
a10 Patients will not use the service because too many errors occur, too often. E.g. in the case of an alert function, error which leads to
triggering of the alert.
During data transfer
c9 Unauthorised persons obtain access to personal (sensitive) information during transfer: measurement values from sensors, textual
information from patient at home
c10 Unauthorised persons obtain access to personal (sensitive) information being transferred in the two-way video conference, both audio
(what is said) and video (see patients in their homes).
i15 Unauthorised persons can modify or delete personal health information during transfer.
i18 Errors during transfer lead to duplication of messages.
a11 Unauthorised persons can delete personal health information during transfer so that it does not reach the intended recipient.
a13 Low network quality (QoS): the quality of the connection is so low that the remote education and exercising is useless.
Henriksen et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:85 Page 7 of 13
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/85
Table 2 List of threats identified in the risk assessment (Continued)
a14 DoS attack (on the network or a network component) so that the information does not reach the intended recipient.
a15 Low network quality (QoS): data is not transferred, is lost during transfer, or is delayed.
a16 Information corrupted or lost during transfer (caused by errors), i.e. cannot be used by the intended recipient.
Data in the central server/database, in the health institution
c11 Unauthorised persons obtain access to personal health information (in server/database) in the health institution. The server contains
information about all patients/participants. If unauthorised persons obtain access, information about several patients can be seen
at a time, not just that concerning a single patient.
i21 Information stored on the central server is deliberately manipulated (modified, deleted) by unauthorised persons.
i22 Information stored on the central server is manipulated (modified, deleted) by mistake (e.g. wrong usage)
a17 Permanent loss of data from central server (because of SW errors or HW failures), data are lost or destroyed
a18 Data on the central server are unavailable for a short or a longer time period (e.g. electricity power failure)
Quality of video communication
q1 The video quality from the patient’s home is inadequate (e.g. because of limited bandwidth, camera type, use of camera, placement of
camera, lighting, etc.) for the healthcare workers to be able to instruct the patients. They do not see clearly enough what the patient is
doing (exercise, use of medical equipment)
q2 Unacceptable audio quality, e.g. echo, jitter, drop-out. The healthcare workers can hear their own echo in the sound from the participants.
The patients at home can hear an echo if the healthcare workers do not use an extra microphone
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The identified threats were given values for likelihood
and consequence. The unique ID of each threat was
written into the corresponding cell of the risk matrix, as
shown in Figure 1. The risk level indicated by the matrix
is analysed, and appropriate treatment of the risk is
proposed.
The risk matrix shows that none of the threats was
regarded as having a catastrophic consequence. For these
particular services, this would seem to be a reasonable
conclusion, as the aim of the home programmes is to
provide education and rehabilitation services; it is not
for use in acute situations or for continuous health mon-
itoring. The matrix also shows that none of the threats
was considered to have a very high likelihood, according
to our definitions in Table 1.
The risk matrix indicates that confidentiality threats
have been identified as the most serious threats. This isFigure 1 Risk matrix showing risk level for identified threats.because all health-related personal information is de-
fined to be sensitive information in the legal regula-
tions [10,12]. It is also worth noting that all the
availability threats were identified as low risk. This
reflects the fact that the services are not intended to
be used for real-time monitoring or for acute situa-
tions. The health diary acts as supplementary infor-
mation for the weekly individual consultations. The
worst consequence of these threats is probably that
the system will lose credibility and the users will fail
to trust it, and will stop using the service if there are
too many such problems.
The only threat that scored an unacceptable High risk
level, c1, is related to confidentiality. It concerns the
case that a third party, e.g. a visitor in the patient’s
home, by chance could access personal health informa-
tion on the TV screen if the system is left switched on
and logged-in. The High risk is a result of the severe
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likelihood of this particular threat.
A technical solution to threat c1 is to implement a
timeout mechanism to be activated after a specified
period without interaction between the user and the
system. The user has to be authenticated again when
reactivating the service. The length of the timeout must
be considered carefully; there is a trade-off between secur-
ity and usability: Too short a timeout will be an annoyance
to the user, who has to log in repeatedly, while a too long
timeout has limited value.
The rest of the threats discussed here are threats
with medium risk. These threats may be acceptable
according to the risk level definitions in Table 1. It is,
however, important to monitor the development of
these threats, as their risk may rise to an unaccept-
able high level in case of increased likelihood. For
many of them, it would be appropriate to implement
risk-reducing measures.
In addition to c1, there are other confidentiality threats
to health information in the patient’s home:
Unauthorised persons, e.g. visitors, in a patient’s home
can see and hear other persons participating in the video
conference (c6). This can happen without the knowledge
of the other participants; they will only see persons
within the camera’s coverage area. On the other hand, it
can be argued that participating in centre-based training
courses also increases the likelihood that other persons
will know about your chronic disease, since it is possible
that family or next-of-kin also participate in some of
these courses.
The user has to be authenticated when logging in to
the RPD. If a PIN is introduced for logging on to the
system, it is quite likely that the patient will write the
code on a paper, and thus make it possible for others to
access the system (c3).
For most of the threats involving the patients in their
homes there are also non-technical measures for risk re-
duction. It is important to give information to the users,
make them aware of the risks and explain the reason for
restrictions imposed by technical solutions and routines
for use. Such education to the users is relevant for
threats c1, c3 and c6.
Threat c4 concerns the security of the information
stored in the RPD in case the dedicated computer is
stolen. The information stored consists of both the
values from sensor measurements and manual input
from the patient, as well as the education videos made
by the healthcare workers. In the design of the system it
was decided that medical data stored in the RPD should
be encrypted, which gives a very low likelihood for this
threat to occur. The education videos were not encrypted;
they do not contain information that is sensitive in terms
of any legislation.Unauthorised persons might exploit potential SW
weaknesses to hack into the RPD and reveal health
information (c7). The likelihood of this is greater than
zero because this is a prototype system; on the other
hand, the opportunities to access the system have been
greatly reduced by setting it up as a dedicated PC, with
access only via dedicated ports and protocols.
Confidentiality threats also arise during information
transfer and when the information is stored in the hos-
pital’s server.
Sensitive information is transferred in both directions
over the Internet. A security requirement which originates
from the legislation is that sensitive data transmitted over
an insecure network, i.e. a network over which the organ-
isation does not have full control, should be encrypted
during transfer. So textual data and sensor values are
encrypted during transfer, and it is therefore less likely
that these data will be revealed (c9). We cannot disregard
the risk that someone is able to wiretap audio and video
during video conferencing sessions (c10). This risk was re-
duced by using Virtual Private Network (VPN) to achieve
private encrypted video conferencing over the Internet.
Data residing in the hospital’s server are covered by
the same security as the rest of the hospital’s systems,
and we consider the likelihood of unauthorised access to
these data to be low (c11).
Most of the threats related to integrity and availability
are considered to have less consequence for the patient,
as long as similar incidents are not repeated over a
long period. This is because decisions for the patients
concerned are not based on single measurements. On
the other hand, if there were systematic incidents over
time (such as threats i3 and i7 which could concern
deliberate registration of wrong values for a long time),
this could perhaps lead to more severe consequences for
the patient’s health. This is also the case for the integrity
of the health information during transfer or while it re-
sides in the hospital server (threats i15, i21). Taking into
account the security measures at the hospital, the likeli-
hood is low that the information stored on the server will
be deliberately manipulated. However, the data on the ser-
ver could also be modified by mistake (i22), for instance if
the user interface is not good enough.
Threats i10, i12 and i14 all relate to the possibility of
obtaining control over the RPD and its content and using
it for illegitimate purposes, either by stealing it (i10) or by
exploiting SW weaknesses to attack the system over the
Internet (i12). If the dedicated computer can be reached
via the network, it might be reconfigured and thus made
available for processes other than those initially intended
(i14). All these are threats with severe consequence, but
we regard their likelihood to be very low.
Threat i8 concerns the possibility that data in the RPD
are corrupted because of SW weaknesses or HW
Henriksen et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:85 Page 10 of 13
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/85problems. If the information still appears to be credible,
this might, in the worst case, cause incorrect advice given
to the patient; if not, it is just unavailable information as
in threat a16. The consequence is considered to be mod-
erate. The information from the electronic health diary
acts as a supplement to the individual consultation where
the patient and the health professional discuss health is-
sues. The information is readable and can therefore be
verified by the patient. No automated decision is made
based on the information from the diary.
Two threats to quality were also identified in the risk
assessment, q1 concerning the video quality and q2
concerning the audio quality. The quality may be di-
minished if the bandwidth is too low or the equipment
is too poor. It might result in blurred pictures, or
delayed video. If, for instance, there is a delay in the
video signals, this might be misinterpreted by the
physiotherapist as the patient not keeping up with the
speed. The audio quality is usually considered more
important than the video quality. The most annoying
problem would be echoing of the sound, a participant
receiving his/her own voice back through the TV set.
Training health workers and patients in the use of the
system will help to reduce the risk of threats such as
q1 and q2.
Discussion
A risk assessment process is continuous and iterative, and
it applies to different phases of the system development
[21]. Our risk assessment was performed following this ap-
proach. Thus, security aspects were incorporated into the
design from an early stage instead of being included as an
add-on to a nearly completed system. This is also referred
to as “Privacy by design”, information security is embedded
into the design; it is proactive instead of reactive, preventive
instead of remedial [5].
Principle results
Of the approximately 50 threats and potential unwanted
incidents that were identified and analysed, none were
regarded as having catastrophic consequence, and only
one threat was identified as having an unacceptable High
risk level. Threats to confidentiality were deemed most
serious. This is because all health-related personal infor-
mation is regarded as sensitive. Most of the threats to
integrity and quality were analysed to have Medium risk,
while threats to availability were regarded Low risk.
Some security measures were planned already in the
design of the system, and these were taken into account
as prerequisites in the risk assessment. Additional measures
were added as a result of the risk assessment. In summary,
the following security measures were included in the design
and implementation of the technical platform [3,4,9], redu-
cing the risk accordingly:– Patient authentication at log-on to the service
(PIN, 4 digits, input using the remote control)
– Timeout: Automatic logoff of user after a given
period of idleness
– Encrypted storage of sensitive user data in the
Residential Patient Device (RPD)
– Encrypted transfer of messages
– Encrypted VPN for video conferencing
– The RPD was configured as a dedicated computer
permitting network access only via selected ports
and protocols. The device could only be reached
from outside through a VPN or SSH port.
– Health diary information is stored both locally and
remotely in order to secure availability
– Education of users, including awareness raising,
information about privacy risks, and education in
secure behaviour
Limitations
There are always questions about completeness when
conducting a risk assessment: Did we identify all risks?
Did we find the most important risks? The answer to
the first question is probably “no”, but we consider the
answer to the second question to be “yes”. The systematic,
structured process for threat identification, together with
thorough documentation, helps to ensure consistency and
improve completeness. The most important effect of the
risk assessment is perhaps the awareness it imposes on
the designers and developers – and on the users, of pos-
sible risks to their system.
The concern about completeness may also be related
to performing a qualitative risk assessment. Our approach
is qualitative, which we find more suitable for the types of
services and information systems we assess. However, one
drawback of qualitative risk analysis methods is that
their nature yields inconsistent results. The results
may be subjective when using qualitative risk analysis
methods [20], and there is uncertainty associated with
this subjective judgment [22].
A question that may be asked regarding the subjective
judgment in our risk assessment is: Were we too strict
in the evaluation of risks? For instance, it may be
debated whether threats with severe consequence but
low likelihood (see risk matrix in Figure 1) should be
defined as moderate or low risk. In our case we con-
cluded that this is moderate risk, because of the severe
consequence.
Generalisation
Another relevant question concerning the risk assessment
is related to generality: Can the result be reused for other
technical solutions or similar services?
The validation of impact of confidentiality threats rela-
tive to threats to other information security aspects may
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the European countries is based on the European privacy
directive (95/46/EC, [10]), but it is a matter of the national
authorities to implement it in their own legislation and
manage the compliance of the regulations. In Norway,
strong emphasis is put on privacy and confidentiality, also
in the healthcare sector.
Within healthcare policy, there is an ongoing discussion
about how to achieve a shift from centre-based rehabilita-
tion to rehabilitation at home with the involvement of
healthcare workers; and further to self-managed rehabilita-
tion, training, and exercise; reducing the involvement of
healthcare staff [1,2]. – This risk assessment had a focus on
risks in the home environment, and many of the identified
threats will apply to home-based solutions in general. The
risks to confidentiality are different at home than in a more
controlled (closed) environment: on the one hand, one is
more private indoors at home; on the other hand it is the
persons in the immediate entourage who can most easily
obtain sensitive information about the patient. The patient
may want to hide sensitive information from close relatives,
yet these may be the very people who are best able to sup-
port patients with chronic conditions.
On the technical side, equipment located in private
homes is more exposed to access by unauthorised per-
sons. For instance, other persons in the same room,
whether they are family members or casual visitors,
may obtain sensitive information from this service.
The equipment is physically available and thus more
likely to be used (or tampered with) by other people in
the family. Enabling electronic communication be-
tween equipment in the patients’ homes, connected to
the open Internet, and equipment placed in the secure
zone of a network (e.g. at a hospital), is another security
challenge.
Until now, the capabilities of commercial TV set-top-
boxes (STB) have been somewhat limited and usually tai-
lored to TV functionality, such as program guides, simple
web browsing, and recording of broadcast TV to hard
disk. However, the next generation of TVs or STBs will
support Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV or “HbbTV”.
The latest innovations include smart TV technologies
where the TV has its own broadband Internet connection
and supports applications (apps) of the type we know
from the mobile world (Apple TV, Google TV, Samsung
smart TV). These TV-apps provide rich functionality on
the TV, with content and functions from the back-end
Internet. These smart TVs do not have touch-sensitive
screens, so user interactions are controlled by means of
the TV’s remote control. Most of the threats identified
in this risk assessment will apply to STBs and smart
TVs, as well.
Many of the threats also apply to solutions and services
intended for mobile devices. There are, however, othertypical threats when dealing with mobile equipment; these
devices are easily mislaid, lost or stolen, thus creating
extra risks, especially to confidentiality and availability.
The use of home technology and mobile solutions will
increasingly supplement and to some extent replace the
physical encounter between patient and healthcare pro-
fessionals. With proper use, this can enhance the privacy
of individuals, but it also provides new challenges. Some
of the responsibility must remain with the users. The pa-
tient must be made aware about potential risks, and the
way in which new technology used in home healthcare
might affect the individual’s privacy [30].
The increased use of personal and mobile electronic
devices inevitably leads to changing attitudes among the
population, regarding privacy – ranging from higher
awareness on one extreme, to greater carelessness on
the other extreme. Similarly, attitudes concerning what
are regarded as private or sensitive information may also
be changing. As well as being a question of legislation,
this is an individual/subjective question. Some users may
want information to remain private even if it is not legally
defined as sensitive information. For example, a woman
who has been badly injured by a violent husband will re-
gard her new address as more “sensitive” than information
about her broken arm. On the other hand, many users will
say “I have nothing to hide”, and some patients do already
present their whole case history on the open Internet
(Facebook, YouTube, Patients-like-me, etc.) [31-33].
Conclusion
A total of approximately 50 threats and potential un-
wanted incidents were identified and analysed in the risk
assessment. The confidentiality threats were evaluated as
being the most serious threats. This reflects the fact that
health-related personal information is regarded as sensi-
tive. All the availability threats were classified as having a
low risk. That is because the aim of the home programmes
is to provide education and rehabilitation services; it is not
intended for use in acute situations or for continuous
health monitoring.
Only one threat was ascribed an unacceptable high risk
level. It concerns the case that a third party, e.g. a visitor
in the patient’s home, might by chance access personal
health information on the TV screen if the system was
left switched on and logged in. A solution to this threat
is to implement a timeout mechanism to be activated
after a specified period without interaction between user
and system. The rest of the threats were identified as
medium or low risk.
Most of the threats identified are representative of
healthcare services intended for patients or citizens in
their homes. The risks to confidentiality are different at
home than in a more controlled environment such as a
hospital, and electronic equipment situated in private
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exposed to access by unauthorised persons.
By implementing the proposed measures, it has been
possible to design a home-based service which ensures
the necessary level of information security and privacy.
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